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Optimal Deterministic Debt Contracts
1 Introduction
In this paper we connect the literature dealing with absolute priority violations with the
literature on optimal debt contracts with costly state veriﬁcation. We show that the
optimal ﬁnancing contract with absolute priority violation is a deterministic simple debt
contract. First we show this result in a general case and subsequently we provide an
application to ﬁnancial contracts with multiple lenders.
Absolute priority rule is one of the major principles of bankruptcy law. It says that
creditors’ claims take precedence over shareholders’ claims in the event of a liquidation or
reorganization. Shareholders are compensated only after creditors have been fully paid oﬀ.
This principle is documented in both empirical, see Claessens and Klapper (2005), and
theoretical studies, see Knot and Vychodil (2005).
Nevertheless absolute priority is quite often violated.For publicly traded ﬁrms Eberhart
and Weiss (1998) and other authors cited by them show that absolute priority was vio-
lated in approximately 50-70% of out-of-court workouts and bankruptcies, depending on
the particular sample used. Similarly Berkowitz and White (2004) document widespread
absolute priority violation for small ﬁrms. Therefore we take absolute priority violation as
given in this paper and we investigate its impact on the form of optimal credit contract.
Since the time Townsend (1979) introduced the costly state veriﬁcation framework, it is
known that contracts with stochastic veriﬁcation Pareto dominate debt contracts. Recently
Krasa and Villamil (2000, 2003) and Krasa, Sharma and Villamil (2004) proposed a related
costly enforcement model in which they show that a deterministic simple debt contract is
optimal when there is a limited commitment and enforcement is imperfect. Our paper
uses the approach introduced by Krasa and Villamil (2000). We prove that allowing for
non-commitment to the original contract and for absolute priority violation leads to simple3
debt being the optimal ﬁnancing contract. Then we show that this result may be naturally
extended to the situation with multiple lenders with publicly observable monitoring results.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides a general
model of the ﬁnancial contracting which we consider in this paper. In section 3 we solve
for an equilibrium contract in this model. Section 4 provides application of our model to
the situation with multiple lenders and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a model with one risk neutral ﬁrm and a large number of risk neutral possible
investors. The ﬁrm has a project which requires one unit of ﬁnancing to be provided by
investors. The project leads to a random output x ∈ X ≡ {x1,...,xn}, where 0 < x1 <
··· < xn. The output is privately observed by the ﬁrm. This private information is the only
information asymmetry in the model. All other information is fully shared by all agents
in the model. The value of output can by veriﬁed by a veriﬁcation agency at a cost c(x).
The results of this veriﬁcation are publicly revealed.
The model has 4 time periods. At the period t = 0 the ﬁrm and investor have a common
prior µ(·) over the possible realizations in the output space X. The ﬁrm speciﬁes that if
at time t=3 the veriﬁcation agency is called upon to determine the state x the investor is
entitled to an enforceable payment G(x,v) ≥ 0. The payment G(x,v) is a function of the
true state x ∈ X and the time t = 1 transfer v from ﬁrm to investor.
At the period t = 1 the ﬁrm privately observes the project realization and subsequently
pays v to the investor. The ﬁrm is free to choose diﬀerent values of v for diﬀerent real-
izations of x. Since we do not allow for a commitment to the original contract we are not
able to use the revelation principle which would otherwise imply that the ﬁrm truthfully
announces the project realization x.
At the period t = 2 the investor may renegotiate the ﬁrm’s oﬀer v with the ﬁrm. He4
may oﬀer that the ﬁrm pays him additional money so that his payoﬀ is now v0 > v. We
do not allow for the possibility that the investor returns some money to the ﬁrm. That
is, we do not allow v0 < v. If the ﬁrm pays the additional amount (v0 − v) it will not ask
the veriﬁcation agency for enforcement (in this paper we will use the terms veriﬁcation
and enforcement interchangeably). In the case this oﬀer of additional money (v0 − v) is
accepted, the game ends, otherwise the game proceeds to the next stage. In the case where
the game ends, the payoﬀs are as follows. The payoﬀ to the investor is v0 > v. The payoﬀ
to the ﬁrm is x − v0.
At the period t = 3 the investor chooses whether to request enforcement. If no en-
forcement is requested, the investor’s payoﬀ remains v and the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is x − v. If
enforcement is requested, the veriﬁcation agency determines the true state x and the in-
vestor pays the veriﬁcation cost c(x). We assume that 0 < c(x) < x and that c(x) is
a continuously diﬀerentiable nondecreasing function of x for all x ∈ X. The ﬁrm pays
G(x,v) to the investor.
We assume that the enforcement is imperfect in the sense that the absolute priority rule
is violated. That is, ﬁrm is always able to keep δ(x) out of project outcome x. We assume
that 0 < δ(x) < x and that δ(x) is a continuously diﬀerentiable nondecreasing function
of x for all x ∈ X. In order to avoid an unlimited liability problem for the investor, we
assume c(x1) + δ(x1) < x1,
∂c(x)
∂x < 1, and
∂δ(x)
∂x < 1 for all x.
The model presented above is very close to the standard costly state veriﬁcation models
of Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1987). We use a generalized
form of costly state veriﬁcation model with a general veriﬁcation cost function c(x) and
with stochastic reporting and veriﬁcation strategies. In addition to the three time periods
present in a standard costly state veriﬁcation model we introduce the renegotiation period,
which is a period t = 2. Crucial diﬀerence from standard costly state veriﬁcation model is
an assumption of absolute priority rule violation. This assumption together with possibility
of renegotiation leads to the optimality of deterministic renegotiation proof simple debt5
contract in our model.
3 The Equilibrium Contract
The investment problem presented in this model constitutes a dynamic game of incomplete
information. We ﬁrst deﬁne the behavioral strategies of the players in this game. We denote
the set of all payments v as V and we deﬁne σF(v|x),v ∈ V to be the ﬁrm’s mixed strategy
at t = 1. We denote the investor’s action of asking for veriﬁcation as e = 1 and that of not
asking for veriﬁcation as e = 0. By σI(e|v) we denote the investor’s behavioral strategy at
t = 3. We deﬁne the ﬁrm’s and investor’s payoﬀs at time t = 3 as:
πF(x,v,e) = x − v − eG(x,v) (1)
πI(x,v,e) = v + e[G(x,v) − c(x)] (2)
We will solve the continuation game for its perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE).
In this equilibrium G(x,v) induces σF and σI which are foreseen by all players. That is, in
the continuation game starting from t = 1, σF maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ given
σI and the strategy σI maximizes the investor’s expected payoﬀ given µ(·|v). The beliefs
µ(·|v) are derived by using Bayes rule whenever possible. From now on we will refer to
{G,σI,σF} as an equilibrium contract.
We assume that there is Bertrand competition among possible investors. Therefore in
stage t = 0 we will assume that the investor chooses {G,σI,σF} to maximize the ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ subject to a set of restrictions. This means that the investor solves

















πI(x,v,e)σI(e|v)σF(v|x)µ(x) ≥ ¯ uI (4)6
σF,σI,µ,µ(·|v) is a PBNE at t = 1 (5)
v,G,σI is renegotiation proof ∀xi ∈ X and ∀v|σF(v|xi) > 0 (6)
0 ≤ G(x,v) ≤ x − v − δ(x)∀x ∈ X. (7)
We will characterize and simplify this Problem.
Note that (7) implies that v ≤ xi − δ(xi) for all xi ∈ X and for all v such that
σF(v|xi) > 0.
In order to provide the condition for renegotiation proofness we ﬁrst formally deﬁne
when the contract is renegotiation proof.
Deﬁnition 1 A contract {G,σI,σF} is renegotiation proof if and only if there does not












πF(x,v,e)σI(e|v),∀x|µ(x|v) > 0. (9)
Given this deﬁnition we provide a suﬃcient and necessary condition for renegotiation
proofness in Lemma 1. The intuition behind Lemma 1 is following. Assume that the
expected continuation payoﬀ from enforcement for the investor is smaller than the lowest
payment which the ﬁrm has to investor in the case of enforcement. Then the ﬁrm is able
to bribe the investor not to ask for veriﬁcation. Condition (10) ensures that this possibility
of bribing will not happen.
Lemma 1 For given payments v and G, let σF,σI be PBNE strategies. Then v,G,σI,σF
is renegotiation proof for all v ∈ V with σI(e = 1|v) > 0 if and only if
X
x∈X
[G(x,v) − c(x)]µ(x|v) ≥ min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
G(x,v). (10)
Proof. We ﬁrst prove suﬃciency. Assume that (10) holds. We show that G,σI,σF is
renegotiation proof. Suppose by contradiction that G,σI,σF is not renegotiation proof.7
Because we suppose that the contract is not renegotiation proof, we know that there
exists v0 which satisﬁes (9)
x − v
0 ≥ x − v − 0G(x,v)σI(0|v) − 1[G(x,v)]σI(e = 1|v),∀x|µ(x|v) > 0,
which simpliﬁes as
v
0 ≤ v + G(x,v)σI(e = 1|v),∀x|µ(x|v) > 0.
Therefore
v
0 ≤ v + σI(e = 1|v) min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
G(x,v). (11)






[v + 0G(x,v) − c(x)]σI(0|v) + 1[G(x,v) − c(x)]σI(e = 1|v)]µ(x|v)
v
0 > v + σI(e = 1|v)
X
x∈X
[G(x,v) − c(x)]µ(x|v). (12)
Inequalities (11) and (12) imply
X
x∈X
[G(x,v) − c(x)]µ(x|v) < min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
G(x,v),
which contradicts (10). This completes the suﬃciency part of the proof.
Now we prove that (10) is a necessary condition. Assume by contradiction that there
exists contract {G,σI,σF}, which is renegotiation proof but violates (10) for some v. Let
v




v + σI(1|v) min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0




which is a violation of (10) as assumed. After substituting (13) into the ﬁrm’s renegotiation
proofness condition (9) we obtain
x − v − σI(1|v) min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
G(x,v) ≥ x − v − σI(1|v)G(x,v),∀x|µ(x|v) > 0,8
which is true by the deﬁnition of minimum. Therefore contract {G,σI,σF} is not renego-
tiation proof, which is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Note, that the necessity part of the proof is true for all possible values of min(x∈X,µ(x|v)>0) G(x,v)
including the zero value.
Lemma 1 straightforwardly implies the optimality of deterministic veriﬁcation, which
is formalized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 If the contract {G,σI,σF} solves Problem 1 with (10) holding as a strict in-
equality, then σI(e = 1|v) ∈ {0,1} for all v such that σF(v|x) > 0 for some x ∈ X.
Proof. Assume that σI(e = 1|v) > 0. The right hand side of (10) is non-negative. There-
fore the investor’s continuation payoﬀ from veriﬁcation, which is given by left hand side
of (10) holding as strict inequality, is strictly positive. Since the continuation payoﬀ from
not verifying is zero, the optimality of investor’s decision requires σI(e = 1|v) = 1.
Q.E.D.
Now we show that the optimal contract solving Problem 1 has two characteristic features
of the debt contract. The ﬁrst feature is that ﬁrm either pays a ﬁxed face value ¯ v or it
does not pay anything and defaults. The second feature is that this default triggers the
veriﬁcation process.
Lemma 3 If the contract {G,σI,σF} solves Problem 1 with (10) holding as a strict in-
equality, then there exists contract { ˜ G, ˜ σI, ˜ σF} which solves Problem 1 with (10) holding as
a strict inequality. The contract { ˜ G, ˜ σI, ˜ σF} has the following properties
1. At most the two payments 0 and ¯ v occur with positive probability. That is µ(v|x) = 0
for all x ∈ X,v / ∈ {0, ¯ v}.9
2. Veriﬁcation is requested if and only if v < ¯ v. That is, σI(e = 1|v) = 1 ⇔ v < ¯ v and
σI(e = 1|v) = 0 ⇔ v ≥ ¯ v.
Proof. First we prove second part of this Lemma. Consider contract {G,σI,σF} that
solves Problem 1. Let vj be some payment which takes place with positive probability
from an ex ante perspective and which is followed by no veriﬁcation. That is, σF(vj|x) > 0
for some x ∈ X and σI(e = 1|vj) = 0. Optimality of σF then implies that σF(v|x) = 0
for all v > vj irrespective of the value of σI(e = 1|v). Therefore without any consequence
for the payoﬀ of any agent we can set σI(e = 1|v) = 0 for all v > vj. If vj = 0, then the
lemma is true. So let vj > 0 and consider v < vj. By Lemma 2, σ(e = 1|v) ∈ {0,1}. If
σI(e = 1|v) = 0, then optimality of σF implies that σF(vj|x) = 0, which is a contradiction.
So, σI(e = 1|v) = 1. Deﬁning ¯ v ≡ vj concludes the proof. Thus there is at most one
payment ¯ v such that σF(¯ v|x) > 0 and σI(e = 1|¯ v) = 0.
Now we prove ﬁrst part of this Lemma. If ¯ v = 0 then by part two there is no veriﬁcation
for any v. This means that the ﬁrm optimally announces ¯ v for all x ∈ X. This means that
the Lemma is true for ¯ v = 0. So let ¯ v > 0. We consider all payments v < ¯ v and we deﬁne
for each xi





Because we have shown that statement two of this Lemma holds and because of Lemma 2,
˜ σI(e = 1|0) = 1. Equation (15) means that in state xi the ﬁrm chooses 0 instead of vk, for
all vk ∈ (0, ¯ v) when the t = 3 payment schedule following a t = 1 payment of 0 is given by
˜ G(xi,0). By choosing 0 instead of vk in state xi the ﬁrm gets
xi − ˜ G(xi,0) = xi − vk − G(xi,vk). (16)
The ﬁrm is therefore for all x ∈ X indiﬀerent between 0 and any payment vk < ¯ v such
that σF(vk|x) > 0. Because σF is optimal, ˜ σF is also optimal. Now we show that ˜ G(xi,0)10
is well deﬁned and does not depend on the choice of vk. For two distinct payments vj and
vk such that σF(vj|xi) > 0 and σF(vk|xi) > 0 we have, due to the optimality of σF
xi − vj − G(xi,vj) = xi − vk − G(xi,vk),
which implies
˜ G(xi,0) = vj + G(xi,vj) = vk + G(xi,vk) = ˜ G(xi,0).
Therefore ˜ G(xi,0) does not depend on the choice of vk. Next we show feasibility of the
redeﬁned enforcement payment. That is, we show 0 ≤ ˜ G(xi,0) ≤ xi−δ(xi). The condition
˜ G(xi,0) ≥ 0 holds by deﬁnition. The minimum payoﬀ of the ﬁrm in state xi is δ(xi).
Optimality of σF implies that the right hand side of (16), and hence the left hand side of
(16) is not less than δ(xi). This implies that ˜ G(xi,0) ≤ xi − δ(xi).
We next show that contract { ˜ G, ˜ σI, ˜ σF} is renegotiation proof. We denote by ˜ µ(xi|0)
the investor’s updated belief given ˜ σF. The deﬁnition of ˜ σF in (15) implies that ˜ µ(xi|0) > 0
if and only if µ(xi|vj) > 0 for some vj < ¯ v. This and (16) imply
min
xi∈X,˜ µ(xi|0)>0
˜ G(xi,0) = min
xi∈X,µ(xi|vj)>0
G(xi,vj) + vj. (17)
Since the contract {G,σI,σF} is renegotiation proof we obtain
X
x∈X























































The equalities (19) and (24) follow from (15). The equality (20) follows from (14). The
equality (21) is given by Bayesian updating. The inequality (22) follows from (10). The
equality (23) follows from (17). Dividing (18) and (24) by
P
x∈X ˜ σF(0|x)µ(x) yields
X
x∈X
[ ˜ G(x,0) − c(x)˜ µ(x|0) ≥ min
x∈X,˜ µ(x|0)>0
˜ G(x,0). (25)
Because of Lemma 1, the contract { ˜ G, ˜ σI, ˜ σF} is renegotiation proof. Also ˜ σI(e = 1|0) = 1
is optimal because the right hand side of (25) is strictly positive.
Q.E.D.
As a consequence of Lemma 3 it is suﬃcient to consider strategies σF for which at most
two payments occur in equilibrium. If payment ¯ v is made, then no veriﬁcation occurs. We
can therefore assume that G(x, ¯ v) = 0. As a consequence, only payments G(·,0) occur in
equilibrium. We deﬁne g(x) = G(x,0). We denote by σd(x) = σF(0|x) the probability that
the ﬁrm defaults. Similarly we deﬁne µ(x|d) = µ(x|v = 0).
Then we can rewrite Problem 1 as









[(g(x) − c(x))σd(x) + ¯ v(1 − σd(x))]µ(x) ≥ ¯ uI (27)
σd(x) =

     
     
1 if ¯ v > g(x)
0 if ¯ v < g(x)
α ∈ [0,1] if ¯ v = g(x).
(28)
If ∃x ∈ X|σd(x) > 0 then:
X
x∈X
[g(x) − c(x)]µ(x|d) ≥ min
x∈X,µ(x|d)>0
g(x) (29)
0 ≤ g(x) ≤ x − δ(x),∀x ∈ X (30)12
In the following proposition we show that the solution of Problem 2 is a debt contract
under which the ﬁrm pays the maximum enforceable payment to the lender in the case of
default.
Proposition 1 As long as renegotiation proofness condition (29) is satisﬁed as a strict
inequality, the optimal payment schedule solving Problem 2 is g(x) = x − δ(x).
Proof. The investor’s participation constraint (27) binds in equilibrium. Suppose by
contradiction that (27) does not bind. Then there exist  > 0 and x0 ∈ X with σd(x0) > 0
such that (27) is still satisﬁed for g0(x0) = g(x0) −  without violating conditions (29) –
(30). Firm’s payoﬀ (26) is higher for g0(x0) than for g(x0) which leads to contradiction.
From binding (27) we obtain
X
x∈X
















x∈X c(x)σd(x)µ(x) then requires g(x) = x − δ(x).
Q.E.D.
In the following section we will provide an application of the model of this section to
the situation with multiple lenders.
4 Application to a Contract with Multiple Lenders
In this section we show that the optimality of simple debt contracts applies also to a
situation with multiple investors. We consider a setting in which besides a small number
of big strategic investors there is a huge number of small investors. These small investors
take market conditions as given and do not strategically inﬂuence the market. These small13
investors do not bargain with the borrowers about the conditions of the credit contract
and leave the monitoring and other interactions with the borrowers to the big strategic
investors. We adopt this structure of a ﬁnancial market from the papers by Rajan and
Winton (1995) and Menichini and Simmons (2002).
In this application we again consider an economy with a risk neutral ﬁrm and a large
number of risk neutral investors. These investors are either quite big or very small. We
denote the big investors as type I and the small investors as type T. The ﬁrm owns
a technology which requires 1 unit of ﬁnancing to be provided by the investors. We
assume that β percent of ﬁnancing is provided by one big strategic investor and the rest
is equally provided by m small non-strategic investors. We assume that this proportion
β is determined exogenously as a parameter of the model. Production and veriﬁcation
technologies and information asymmetry are the same as in the general model in Section 2.
The timing of the model corresponds to the timing in section 2 as closely as possible
. In period t = 0 the ﬁrm and all investors have a common prior µ(·) over the possible
realizations in the output space X. The ﬁrm borrows β percent of the required ﬁnance from
one strategic investor I and
(1−β)
m percent from each small investor. The ﬁrm speciﬁes that
if at time t=3 the veriﬁcation agency is called upon to determine the state x the following
happens. Each one of the small investors is entitled to
ηxx
m . The strategic investor is entitled
to an enforceable payment ηfF(x,v) ≥ 0. This speciﬁcation of enforceable payment is a
special case of the general model in Section 2.
In period t = 1 the ﬁrm privately observes the project realization and announces what
the value of transfer v will be. All investors immediately obtain their share of this payment
v. Each investor obtains v units of money per unit of their ﬁnancial investment provided
at time t = 0.
In period t = 2 the strategic investor may renegotiate the ﬁrm’s oﬀer v with the ﬁrm.
He may oﬀer that the ﬁrm pay him additional money so that his payoﬀ is now v0 > v. If
the ﬁrm pays this additional money he will not ask for enforcement. In the case this oﬀer14
is accepted, the game ends, otherwise the game proceeds to the next stage. In the case the
game ends, the payoﬀs are as follows. The payoﬀ of strategic investor is βv0 > βv. The
payoﬀ of each of the small investors is
(1−β)v
m . The payoﬀ of the ﬁrm is x−βv0 −(1−β)v.
In period t = 3 the strategic investor chooses whether to request veriﬁcation. If no
enforcement is requested, the investors’ payoﬀs remain βv and
(1−β)v
m and the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ
is x−v. If veriﬁcation is requested, the strategic investor, who asked for it, pays cost c and
the veriﬁcation agency determines the true state x. Our assumption of constant veriﬁcation
cost c is a simpliﬁcation of the more general form c(x) which we used in Section 2. The
ﬁrm pays ηfF(x,v) to the strategic investor and
ηxx
m to each of the m small investors.
We assume that the cost c paid by the investor asking for enforcement is suﬃciently
high and the investment share
1−β
m of any of the small investors is suﬃciently low so that
it is never optimal for a small investor to initiate the costly state veriﬁcation proceedings.
We also assume that the enforcement is imperfect in the sense that the ﬁrm is always able
to keep some part of project outcome. Formally we capture this by assuming:




The upper bound on F(x,v) is based on the following consideration. Given that v was
paid in the period t = 1 and there was no renegotiation in the period t = 2, x−v remains
to be distributed at t = 3. We capture imperfect enforcement by assuming that the ﬁrm
is able to keep at least (1 − ηf − ηx)(x − v). The feasibility condition
x − v ≥ ηfF(x,v) + ηxx + (1 − ηf − ηx)(x − v)
then leads to an upper bound on F(x,v) in (31).
We deﬁne the ﬁrm’s and investors’ payoﬀs at t = 3 as:
πF(x,v,e) = x − v − e[ηfF(x,v) + ηx(x − v)] (32)







,∀i ∈ {1,...,m}. (34)15
In the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the continuation game, F(x,v) induces σF
and σI which are foreseen by all players. Therefore we will from now refer to {F,σI,σF}
as an equilibrium contract.
We assume that there is Bertrand competition among possible strategic investors.
Therefore in stage t = 0 we will assume that the strategic investor chooses contract
{F,σI,σF} to maximize the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ subject to a set of restrictions. This means
that the strategic investor solves

























πi(x,v,e)σI(e|v)σF(v|x)µ(x) ≥ ¯ ui,∀i (37)
σF,σI,µ,µ(·|v) is a PBNE at t = 1 (38)
v,F,σI is renegotiation proof ∀xi ∈ X and ∀v|σF(v|xi) > 0 (39)
0 ≤ F(x,v) ≤ x − v −
ηx
ηf
v,∀v ≤ x,x ∈ X. (40)
We will characterize and simplify this Problem.
First note that since all m small investors are identical and non-strategic, we can
represent them by one aggregate non-strategic investor. We assume that the small lenders
are not able to collude either because of some legal or institutional reasons or because of

















Also note that (40) implies v ≤
ηf
ηf+ηxx, which implies that v < x.
In order to provide the condition for renegotiation proofness we ﬁrst formally deﬁne
when the contract is renegotiation proof.
Deﬁnition 2 A contract {F,σI,σF} is renegotiation proof if and only if there does not













πF(x,v,e)σI(e|v),∀x|µ(x|v) > 0. (44)
Given this deﬁnition we provide a suﬃcient and necessary condition for renegotiation
proofness in Lemma 4. The intuition behind Lemma 4 is following. Assume that the
expected continuation payoﬀ from enforcement for the strategic investor is smaller than
the lowest payment which the ﬁrm has to pay both strategic and nonstrategic investors in
the case of enforcement. Then the ﬁrm is able to bribe the strategic investor not to ask the
veriﬁcation agency for enforcement. Condition (45) ensures that this possibility of bribing
will not happen.
Lemma 4 For given v and F, let σF,σI be a PBNE strategies. Then v,F,σI,σF is rene-
gotiation proof for all v ∈ V with σI(e = 1|v) > 0 if and only if
X
x∈X
ηfF(x,v)µ(x|v) − c ≥ min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
ηfF(x,v) + ηxx. (45)
Proof. In Appendix.
Lemma 4 implies that enforcement is deterministic.
Lemma 5 If the contract {F,σI,σF} solves Problem 3, then the veriﬁcation is determin-
istic. That is, σI(e = 1|v) ∈ {0,1} for all v such that σF(v|x) > 0 for some x ∈ X.17
Proof. In Appendix.
Now we show that the optimal contract solving Problem 3 has two characteristic features
of the debt contract. The ﬁrst feature is that the ﬁrm either pays a ﬁxed face value ¯ v or
it does not pay anything and defaults. The second feature is that this default triggers the
veriﬁcation process.
Lemma 6 Let {F,σI,σF} solve Problem 3. Then there exists { ˜ F, ˜ σI, ˜ σF} which solves
Problem 3 with the following properties
1. At most the two payments 0 and ¯ v occur with positive probability, i.e., µ(v|x) = 0 for
all x ∈ X,v / ∈ {0, ¯ v}.
2. Veriﬁcation takes places if and only if v < ¯ v, i.e., σI(e = 1|v) = 1 ⇔ v < ¯ v and
σI(e = 1|v) = 0 ⇔ v ≥ ¯ v.
Proof. In Appendix.
As a consequence of Lemma 6 it is suﬃcient to consider strategies σF for which at most
two payments occur in equilibrium. If payment ¯ v is made, then no veriﬁcation occurs. We
can therefore assume that F(x, ¯ v) = 0. As a consequence, only payments F(·,0) occur in
equilibrium. Deﬁne f(x) = F(x,0). Let σd(x) = σF(0|x) be the probability of default. Let
µ(x|d) = µ(x|v = 0).
Then we can rewrite Problem 3 as













[ηxxσd(x) + (1 − β)¯ v(1 − σd(x))]µ(x) ≥ ¯ uT, (48)18
σd(x) =

     
     
1 if ¯ v > ηff(x) + ηxx
0 if ¯ v < ηff(x) + ηxx
α ∈ [0,1] if ¯ v = ηff(x) + ηxx.
(49)
If ∃x ∈ X|σd(x) > 0 then:
X
x∈X
ηff(x)µ(x|d) − c ≥ min
x∈X,µ(x|d)>0
ηff(x) + ηxx (50)




x,∀x ∈ Xsuch that σd(x) = 0. (52)
In the following proposition we show that the solution of the Problem 4 is a debt
contract under which the ﬁrm pays maximum enforceable payment to strategic lender in
the case of default.
Proposition 2 As long as renegotiation proofness condition (50) is satisﬁed as a strict
inequality, the optimal payment schedule solving Problem 4 is f(x) = x.
Proof. In Appendix.
5 Conclusion
In our paper we deal with the problem of deriving an optimal investment ﬁnancing contract.
Since we do not allow for the commitment to the original contract we are not able to use
the standard revelation principle argument as introduced by Townsend (1979). Instead
we use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept as used in related papers by Krasa and
Villamil (2000) and Bester and Strausz (2001).
Since Townsend (1979) it is known that when the commitment to the original con-
tract is possible then in the costly state veriﬁcation model the contracts with stochastic
enforcement dominate the contracts with deterministic enforcement. This result continues
to hold in the costly state veriﬁcation models with impossibility of commitment, as shown19
by Choe (1998) and Khalil and Parigi (1998) in the models with one investor and only
two possible outcomes of investment projects. Menichini and Simmons (2002) show that
the optimality of stochastic enforcement survives an introduction of multiple investors into
the costly state veriﬁcation model with two possible outcomes and with impossibility of
commitment.
In our model we show that allowing for more than two possible outcomes and allowing
for absolute priority violation together with using costly state enforcement as introduced by
Krasa and Villamil (2000) leads to diﬀerent results. The optimal contract in our model is a
renegotiation proof deterministic debt contract. We ﬁrst show the optimality of simple debt
contract for the situation with a single investor ﬁnancing the project. Then we apply our
model to the investment project with two classes of investors and we show that optimality
of the deterministic debt contract continues to hold in this framework too.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4. We ﬁrst prove suﬃciency. Assume that (45) holds. We show
that {F,σI,σF} is renegotiation proof. Suppose by contradiction that {F,σI,σF} is not
renegotiation proof.
Because we suppose that the contract is not renegotiation proof, there exists v0 which
satisﬁes (44)
x − (1 − β)v − βv
0 ≥ x − v − [ηfF(x,v) + ηxx]σI(e = 1|v)
β(v
0 − v) ≤ [ηfF(x,v) + ηxx]σI(e = 1|v)
β(v
0 − v) ≤ σI(e = 1|v) min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
[ηfF(x,v) + ηxx]. (53)






[βv + ηfF(x,v) − c]σI(e = 1|v)µ(x|v)20
β(v
0 − v) > σI(e = 1|v)
X
x∈X
ηfF(x,v)µ(x|v) − c. (54)
Inequalities (53) and (54) imply
X
x∈X
ηfF(x,v)µ(x|v) − c < min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
ηfF(x,v) + ηxx,
which contradicts (45). This completes the suﬃciency part of the proof.
Now we prove that (45) is necessary. Assume by contradiction that there exists contract
{F,σI,σF}, which is renegotiation proof but violates (45) for some v. Let
v
0 = v + σI(1|v)[ min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
ηfF(x,v) + ηxx]. (55)
Because we assume that (45) is violated, the strategic investor’s expected payoﬀ, which is
given by the v + [σI(1|v) times left hand side of (45)] is smaller than v0 in (55). Therefore
the strategic investor strictly prefers to renegotiate. After substituting (55) into the ﬁrm’s
renegotiation proofness condition (44) we obtain
x − (1 − β)v − βv − βσI(1|v)[ min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
ηfF(x,v) + ηxx] ≥
x − v − 0[·]σI(0|v) − 1[ηfF(x,v) + ηxx]σI(1|v)
ηfF(x,v) + ηxx ≥ β[ min
x∈X,µ(x|v)>0
ηfF(x,v) + ηxx].
Since β < 1 and ηxx > 0, we see that the condition (44) holds even as a strict inequality.
This means that the entrepreneur is strictly better oﬀ. Therefore the contract {F,σI,σF}
is not renegotiation proof, which is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5. Assume that σI(e = 1|v) > 0. The right hand side of (45) is
strictly positive. Therefore the strategic investor’s continuation payoﬀ from veriﬁcation,
which is given by left hand side of (45), is strictly positive. But the continuation payoﬀ
from not enforcing is zero. Therefore, σI(e = 1|v) = 1.21
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6. First we prove part two. Consider {F,σI,σF} that solves Prob-
lem 3 and let vj be some payment which takes place with positive probability from an
ex ante perspective and which is followed by no veriﬁcation, i.e., σF(vj|x) > 0 for some
x ∈ X and σI(e = 1|vj) = 0. Optimality of σF then implies that σF(v|x) = 0 for all v > vj
irrespective of the value of σI(e = 1|v). Hence without any consequence for the payoﬀ of
any agent we can set σI(e = 1|v) = 0 for all v > vj. If vj = 0, then the lemma is true. So
let vj > 0 and consider v < vj. By Lemma 5, σ(e = 1|v) ∈ {0,1}. If σI(e = 1|v) = 0, then
optimality of σF implies that σF(vj|x) = 0, which is a contradiction. So, σI(e = 1|v) = 1.
Deﬁning ¯ v ≡ vj completes the proof. In this way we proved that there is at most one
payment ¯ v for which σF(¯ v|x) > 0 and σI(e = 1|¯ v) = 0.
Now we prove the ﬁrst part of this Lemma. If ¯ v = 0 then according to second part
of this Lemma the investor does not request veriﬁcation for any v. This means that ﬁrm
optimally announces ¯ v for all x ∈ X. This means that lemma is true for ¯ v = 0. So let









Because we have shown that statement two of this Lemma holds and because of Lemma 5,
˜ σI(e = 1|0) = 1. Equation (57) means that in state xi the ﬁrm chooses 0 instead of vk, for
all vk ∈ (0, ¯ v) when the t = 3 payment schedule following a t = 1 payment of 0 is given by
˜ F(xi,0). By choosing 0 instead of vk in state xi the ﬁrm gets
xi − 0 − ηf ˜ F(xi,0) − ηxxi = xi − vk − ηfF(xi,vk) − ηxxi. (58)
The ﬁrm is therefore for all x ∈ X indiﬀerent between 0 and any payment vk < ¯ v such
that σF(vk|x) > 0. Because σF is optimal, ˜ σF is also optimal for the ﬁrm.22
The payoﬀ of strategic investor when the payoﬀ schedule ˜ F(x,0) is applied is
0 + ηf ˜ F(x,0) = vk + ηfF(x,vk).
This means that the payoﬀ of the strategic investor is not changed by this transformation.
Now we will show that the transformed enforceable payment is feasible, that is 0 ≤
˜ F(xi,0) ≤ xi. By deﬁnition ˜ F(xi,0) ≥ 0. The minimum payoﬀ of the ﬁrm in state xi is
(1 − ηf − ηx)xi. Optimality of σF implies that the right hand side of (58), and hence the
left hand side of (58) is not less than (1 − ηf − ηx)xi. That is,
xi − 0 − ηf ˜ F(xi,0) − ηxxi ≥ (1 − ηf − ηx)xi (59)
˜ F(xi,0) ≤ xi. (60)
We next show that { ˜ F, ˜ σI, ˜ σF} is renegotiation proof. Let ˜ µ(xi|0) be the strategic
investor’s updated prior given ˜ σF. The deﬁnition of ˜ σF in (57) implies that ˜ µ(xi|0) > 0 if
and only if µ(xi|vj) > 0 for some vj < ¯ v. This and (58) imply
min
xi∈X,˜ µ(xi|0)>0
ηf ˜ F(xi,0) = min
xi∈X,µ(xi|vj)>0
ηfF(xi,vj) + vj. (61)
It is also true that
X
x∈X














































The equalities (63) and (68) follow from (57). The equality (64) follows from (56). The
equality (65) is given by Bayesian updating. The inequality (66) follows from (45). The
equality (67) follows from (61). Dividing (62) and (68) by
P
x∈X ˜ σF(0|x)µ(x) yields
X
x∈X
ηf ˜ F(x,0)˜ µ(x|0) − c ≥ min
x∈X,˜ µ(x|0)>0
ηf ˜ F(x,0) + ηxx. (69)
Because of Lemma 4, the contract { ˜ F, ˜ σI, ˜ σF} is renegotiation proof. Also ˜ σI(e = 1|0) = 1
is optimal because the right hand side of (69) is strictly positive.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Strategic investor’s participation constraint (47) binds in
equilibrium. Suppose by contradiction that (47) does not bind. Then there exist  > 0
and x0 ∈ X with σd(x0) > 0 such that (47) is still satisﬁed for f0(x0) = f(x0) −  without
violating conditions (48) – (52). Firm’s payoﬀ (46) is higher for f0(x0) than for f(x0) which
leads to contradiction.
Case 1. Non-strategic investor’s participation constraint (48) binds.
By adding (47) and (48) we obtain
X
x∈X
















x∈X cσd(x)µ(x) then requires f(x) = x.
Case 2. Non-strategic investor’s participation constraint (48) does not bind.



















x∈X[(1 − β)ηff(x) − βηxx − c]σd(x)µ(x)
β
. (71)
Since right-hand-side of (71) is increasing in f(x), setting f(x) = x maximizes E0[uF(x)].
Q.E.D.
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